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COMMENTS
Agency Discretion to Accept Comment in
Informal Rulemaking: What Constitutes "Good
Cause" Under the Administrative Procedure Act?
Through their ability to promulgate rules that have the
force of law, federal agencies have substantial power to affect
the personal and property rights of United States citizens. In
recognition of the influence wielded by such agencies, Congress
in 1946 enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)l "to
afford parties affected by administrative powers a means of
knowing what their rights are and how they may be protected.'"
Under the Act an agency engaging in informal rulemakings is
required to follow the procedure established in 5 U.S.C. 5 553:
which calls for notice to the parties affected and an opportunity
for those interested to comment upon the proposed rules. Section 553 provides that notice and opportunity to comment need
not be provided "when the agency for good cause finds . . . that
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest?
This Comment addresses the nature and scope of the "good
cause exception" to the general requirement of prior notice and
comment in informal rulemaking? A discussion of federal court
1. Ch. 324,
1-12,60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version codified in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C.).
2. S. REP. NO.752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1945) (hereinafter cited as S. REP. NO.
752); see also H.R. REP. NO.1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1946) (hereinafter cited as
H.R. REP. NO.1980).
3. " '[Rlule making' means agency process for the formulating, amending, or repealing a rule." 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1976). " '[R]ule7 means the whole or a part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice
requirements of an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the future of
rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganization thereof, prices, facilities,
appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing." Id. 3 551(4).
4. 5 U.S.C. 553 (1976).
5. Id. 5 553(b)(B).
6. The informal - or notice and comment - rulemaking procedure requires publication of notice in the Federal Register and opportunity for those interested to submit
oral or written comments. 5 U.S.C. 8 553 (1976). The APA also establishes a formal
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interpretation and application of the exception develops its contours and serves as a foundation for a proposed rule to govern
its application.

The minimum procedure an agency must follow in promulgating a rule is governed by 5 U.S.C. $ 553.' This section requires that the agency publish a proposed rule in the Federal
Register and invite comment from interested parties, either with
or without an opportunity for oral presentation. The agency is
then required to consider the data thus gathered in its formulation of the final rule. The final rule is to be published at least
thirty days before it is to take effect, providing an opportunity
for protests to be directed at the final version before its impact
is felt.
This procedure serves two functions: allowing public participation in rulemaking and promoting agency education? Providing interested members of the public an opportunity to participate is crucial to the maintenance of a representative form of
government, since rulemaking is a delegation of legislative power
to a nonrepresentative body.@And while hearing the public, the
agency draws upon the public's knowledge - particularly upon
the expertise of individuals with special training and skills in the
area to be regulated, and upon the experience of those to be affected by the rule. When scrupulously followed, the rulemaking
procedure effectuates the intended purposes of the APA, which
are (1)to adequately protect the private interests involved, (2)
to make only reasonable and authorized regulations, (3) to impartially confer authorized benefits or privileges, and (4) to fully
rulemaking procedure "[wlhen rules are required by statute to be made on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing." Id. § 553(c). The formal rulemaking procedure
requires "trial type" hearings, including the right to submit evidence and to cross-ex556-557; B. SCHWARTZ,
ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW172-73 (1976).
amine. See id.
7. H.R. REP.NO. 1980, supra note 2, a t 16. Section 553 applies only when no adjudication has been required by statute. If a statute requires adjudication-"to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing9'-§ 554 governs the proceedings. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976).
8. Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 730,744 (3d Cir. 1979); Pacific
Coast European Conf. v. United States, 350 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 958 (1965). See also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 777-79 (1969)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
9. Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740,744 (3d Cir. 1979); Hotch v.
United States, 212 F.2d 280, 282 (9th Cir. 1954).
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effectuate the declared policies of Congress.lo

From the overall requirements of prior notice and opportunity for comment in the rulemaking procedure, Congress carved
out specific exceptions where observance of the procedure would
not be feasible, practical, or necessary. Among these is the good
cause exception, upon which this Comment will focus.ll The
good cause exception found in section 553(b)(B) excludes a rule
from the notice and comment requirement "when the agency for
good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and
public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest."la This exception is designed to give
agencies flexibility in the promulgation of substantive rules by
allowing them discretion to dispense with notice and comment
for rules dealing with matters not otherwise exempted from the
rulemaking procedure. However, the use of any of the exceptions
to the notice and comment requirement is to be strictly limited.'" As stated in the House Judiciary Committee Report on
the APA: "The principal purpose of [section 5531 is . . . to provide that the legislative functions of administrative agencies
shall so far as possible be exercised only upon public participa,914
tion .
The terms "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest," limiting the circumstances in which the good
cause exception is to be employed,16 are defined in the Senate
Judiciary Committee Report on the APA as follows:

...

"Impracticable" means a situation in which the due and required execution of the agency functions would be unavoidably
10. H.R. REP.NO. 1980, supra note 2, a t 18.
11. Other exceptions to the notice and comment requirement are for rulemaking
involving "a military or foreign affairs function of the United States," 5 U.S.C. 3
553(a)(1) (1976), for rulemaking involving "a matter relating to agency management or
personnel or to public property, loans, grant., benefits or contracts," id. 3 553(a)(2), and
for rulemaking involving "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of
agency organization, procedure or practice," id. 3 553(b)(A).
12. Id. 553(b)(B).
13. See, e.g., Housing Auth. of Omaha v. United States Housing Auth., 468 F.2d 1 , 9
(8th Cir. 1954); Hotch v. United States, 212 F.2d 280, 282 (9th Cir. 1954).
14. H.R. REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, a t 23.
15. 5 U.S.C. 8 553(b)(3)(B) (1976).
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prevented by its undertaking public rule-making proceedings.
"Unnecessary" means unnecessary so far as the public is concerned, as would be the case if a minor or merely technical
amendment in which the public is not particularly interested
were involved. "Public interest" supplements the terms "impracticable" or "unnecessary"; it requires that public rulemaking procedures shall not prevent an agency from operating
and that, on the other hand, lack of public interest in rulemaking warrants an agency to dispense with public
procedure. l6

As is apparent from these definitions, the parameter of the good
cause exception is rather narrowly confined. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report makes clear that it is not an "escape
clause"; reliance on the provision must be conditioned upon a
"true and supported or supportable finding of necessity or emergency . . . made and published."17 Representative Walter, commenting on the proposed Administrative Procedure Act before
the House of Representatives, stated that the good cause exception "may be made operative only where facts and interests are
such that notice and proceedings are impossible or manifestly
unnecessary."I8
Congress realized that strict adherence to the requirement
of notice and comment would not always be possible, that under
certain conditions notice and opportunity for comment would
clog the functioning of an agency to the point of destroying its
effectiveness to deal with the problems delegated to it by Congress. However, Congress also realized that such circumstances
should arise infrequently, and it expected that the agencies
would use sound discretion in determining when circumstances
warranted the use of the good cause exception.lB
A good cause exception also exists to the section 553(d) requirement that a final rule be published thirty days before its
16. S. REP. NO. 752, supra note 2, at 14; see also H.R. REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2,
a t 24.
17. S. REP. NO. 752, supra note 2, a t 14. The original Senate version of 5 553
phrased the good cause exception as "any situation in which the agency for good cause
finds notice and public procedure thereon impracticable because of unavoidable lack of
time or other emergency." S. 7, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(3) (1945), reprinted in
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORYMANUALFOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE
ACT 38
(1947). The Senate Report was drafted after the change to the current language.
18. 92 CONG.REC. 5650 (1946).
19. See SENATE
COMM.ON THE JUDICIARY,
7 % CONG.,
~
ST SESS.,REPORT
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT(Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 248,79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 11, 19 (1946).
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effective date.20 The congressional reports make clear that this
provision in no way relates to the notice and comment requirement," but the federal courts have not always been careful to
maintain the distinction." A circuit court, interpreting the section 553(d) good cause exception to require a lesser degree of
good cause than the section 553(b)(B) exception, recently used
the section 553(d) exception to support its approval of comment
after promulgation of a rule as a substitute for prepromulgation
notice and comment.2s

A. Development of the Contours of the 'Good Cause"
Exception by the Federal Courts
Cases where the courts have approved agency use of the
good cause exception fall into three general categories: (1)where
public notification in advance of the rule promulgation would
exacerbate the problem sought to be alleviated by the rule; (2)
where the delay in promulgation of the rule would or could have
a direct detrimental effect on public health, safety, or welfare;
and, (3) where the court deems the need for notice and comment
under the rulemaking procedure unnecessary. The first two categories are based generally on. t h e "impracticable" aspect of the
exception; the third category is, of course, based on the "unnecessary" aspect.
1. Exacerbation of Problem

The first category of cases in which the courts have upheld
the agency use of the good cause exception to notice and comment-where the objective sought by the regulation would be
frustrated by prior public notification-presents the strongest
case for the approval of the exceptions. A typical case in this
category results from an agency fixing or removing a price ceiling.24 The good cause argued for dispensing with notice and
20. 5 U.S.C. 8 553(d)(3) (1976).
21. See S. REP.NO. 752, supra note 2, at 15; H.R. REP.NO. 1980, supra note 2, at
25.
22. See, e.g., Reeves v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975); Kelly v. United States Dep't of Interior, 339 F. Supp. 1095
(E.D. Cal. 1972).
23. See United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 710 (1980).
24. See, e.g., Nader v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 1064 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975); DeRieux
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comment is that those to be affected by the regulation, on becoming aware of the impending imposition or lifting of the ceiling, would withhold the commodity in anticipation of the removal of the ceiling, or would raise prices to have a higher base
when the ceiling was imposed. In these cases prior public notice
is clearly "impracticable" in the sense of the Senate Judiciary
Committee definition; it would prevent the agency from fulfilling
its function.
, ~ ~Cost of Living Council (CLC),
In Nader v. S a ~ h i l l the
without public notice or provision of opportunity to present
views,a6 amended its Phase IV price regulation covering domestic crude petroleum to allow an immediate one dollar per barrel
increase in the maximum ceiling price charged for "old oil."27
The CLC justified dispensing with the procedural requirements
of section 553 on the basis that the need "to provide immediate
guidance and information with respect to the decisions of the
Council" constituted good cause." The court found this statement of good cause insufficient, but held that good cause was
present because advance announcement of the proposed price
increase would have resulted in producers withholding "old oil"
from the market until the price increase took effect, defeating
the purpose of the regulation-alleviation of shortages caused by
the Arab oil embargo.2eWhile this case seemed to present legitimate good cause, the court felt impressed to "stress categorically
that our resolution of the procedural issues herein is founded
upon the unique circumstances in which this price increase was
v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896
(1974); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Federal Energy Admin., 447 F. Supp. 1135 (D.
Kan.),rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Energy Reserves Group, Inc., v. Department of
Energy, 589 F.2d 1082 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App, 1978).
25. 514 F.2d 1064 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975).
26. The procedural requirements of 5 U.S.C. 5 553 were made applicable to the CLC
by 5 207 of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 5 207, 85 Stat.
747 (1971) (uncodified) (amending Pub. L. No. 91-380, 84 Stat. 799 (1970) (uncodified)).
27. "Old oil" is oil produced at the May 15, 1973 level of production. See 38 Fed.
Reg. 34,985 (1973). "New oil," oil that was in excess of the May 15, 1973 level of production, was unregulated and allowed to rise to the world price level in an effort to encourage domestic production. Id. a t 34,986.
28. Id.
29. Though the CLC had not fully satisfied the requirements of 5 553(b)(3)(B)because it had failed to publish an adequate finding of good cause and supporting reasons therefor with the rules issued-the facts to support a finding of good cause was
evident and compelling. The court therefore upheld the regulations. However, it warned
that "repeated technical noncompliance [would] not be tolerated." 514 F.2d a t 1069.
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formulated. Assuming less calamitous circumstances, we fully
expect that any future decisions will take the utmost advantage
of full and open public comment."3o
The court apparently felt that under certain circumstances
the removal of a price ceiling would not be sufficient good cause
to dispense with public proceedings. This would be true of cases
where the policy upon which the rule was based was not to ensure the supply of a commodity, but to increase the profit outlook of a regulated service. For example, a railroad would not be
expected to refuse to haul freight simply because it anticipated
being able to charge more for the haulage in the future. Since
the result sought would not be frustrated by public notice prior
to promulgation of the rule, good cause would not exist to dispense with notice and comment. The purpose of the regulation
is therefore important in a determination of whether or not
there is good cause.
In some cases the form of the regulation may be significant.
For example, if a price ceiling fixed to control inflation is based
on the transactions occurring during a 30-day period prior to the
promulgation of the rule, good cause exists to dispense with notice and comment. Any notice of the impending regulation
would fuel inflation by fostering price increases during the 30day period by businesses desiring to push the price ceiling affecting them as high as possible.'l However, if the regulation
were to establish a fixed price ceiling without regard to transactions occurring in the industry, the prior notice would not have
any effect on the market contrary to that sought by regulation
and therefore no good cause would exist?'
30. Id. (emphasis in original).
31. See DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 419 US. 896 (1974). While there was sufficient good cause in this case to allow
the regulations to be published without providing for public notice and comment, the
regulations had an interesting twist as applied to Five Smiths, Inc. As operator of the
Atlanta Falcons, Five Smiths raised its season ticket prices and sold tickets for games to
be played during 1971. Thereafter, Executive Order 11,615 fixed a 90-day price ceiling
based on transactions occurring during the 30-day period prior to the promulgation of
the regulation. Although the tickets were delivered before the freeze went into effect, the
court looked at the playing of games rather than the sale of the tickets as the completion
of the transaction. Rejecting challenges based on statutory interpretation and constitutional rights, the court held that the Falcons were bound during the 90-day freeze by the
ticket prices charged for games played in 1970.
32. In fact, the competition to sell goods at the best price possible before the ceiling
is imposed, and the tendency to withhold purchase until then, could result in a market
reduction to the proposed ceiling price prior to implementation of the regulation. See,
e.g., Consumers Union, Inc. v. Sawhill, 393 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curium, 523
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2. Public Health, Safety, or Welfare

In the second category, courts have approved agency good
cause based on the possibility that delay in promulgation could
have detrimental consequences on public health, safety, or wel~
fare. In Allegheny Airlines u. Village of C e d a r h u r ~ ta, ~municipal ordinance prohibiting flights below 1,000 feet was challenged
on the ground that the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 had preempted the field. The village responded with the claim that the
air traffic pattern directing planes landing at Idlewild Airport
over the village was adopted without notice to all interested parties as required by 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (the predecessor of section
553)34and was consequently invalid. A prior regulation prescribing a different traffic pattern, in effect from February 3, 1949
until August 1950, had been adopted with compliance to the notice and comment procedures.8s Based on evidence that the earlier pattern was unsafe and on a statement in the rule that the
traffic pattern was " 'adopted without delay in order to promote
safety of the flying public' and that 'compliance with the notice
procedures and effective date provision of [section 10031, would
be impracticable and contrary to the public interest, and therefore is not required,' "M the court with little discussion held that
the procedural requirements had been met.
It is apparent that under appropriate circumstances public
safety would constitute good cause to dispense with notice and
comment, particularly where the safety interest sought to be
protected by the regulation significantly outweighed the impact
of the regulation on a small segment of the public. However, the
Allegheny Airlines summary treatment of the issue is unsatisfying; none of the evidence of the unsafe nature of the prior flight
pattern is presented in the opinion.37 The fact that the prior
F.2d 1404 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975).
33. 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
34. The rulemaking procedure enacted in the Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324,
5 4, 60 Stat. 238 (1946), was originally codified a t 5 U.S.C. $ 1003. In 1966, as part of a
general revision and recodification of laws relating to government organizations and employees, the rulemaking procedure was revised and recodified a t 5 U.S.C. $ 553. Act of
Sept. 6, 1966 Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (1966). The relevant provisions of former
5 1003 were substantially the same as current 5 553.
35. 132 F. Supp. at 883-84.
36. Id. at 884.
37. On appeal the Second Circuit also gave cavalier treatment to the issue stating:
"Additional contentions made by the appellants [including the notice and comment argument] have not been overlooked but they do not in our opinion merit discussion."

.
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flight pattern was allowed to be followed for eighteen months
before the Civil Aeronautics Board felt compelled to promulgate
a new patternS8tends to diminish the likelihood that accommodation of the opportunity for public comment would have significantly compromised the safety of the flying public. Based on
the support offered in the Allegheny Airlines decision, it could
not be fairly inferred that it was impracticable to allow for notice and comment in the sense that such an allowance would
have impaired the functioning of the agency in providing for the
public safety. It is this standard that Congress intended?
Detroit Edison Co. u. EPA40 supports the view that there
must be an element of exigency for notice and comment to be
dispensed with on public health or safety grounds. There, a regulation requiring sulfur dioxide emission sources to comply with
limitations on sulfur in fuel and emission rates of sulfur dioxide
was promulgated without prior notice and opportunity for comment. The health, safety, and welfare impact of continued failure to meet the limitations on emission was significant, yet the
court ruled that because of the substantial impact of the regulations and because of the EPA's failure to show that the regulations were based on emergency, the Administrator could not justify lack of notice and comment as "impracticable, unnecessary,
or contrary to the public interest.'"' Detroit Edison points out
that in cases where the good cause asserted is potential damage
to the health, safety, and welfare of the public, this potential
damage must be balanced with the impact on the parties affected by the regulation in determining whether the good cause
asserted is adequate to dispense with notice and ~omrnent?~
3. Lack of Necessity

Court approval of agency assertions of good cause based on
lack of necesssity for notice and comment constitutes the third
category. Cases in this area indicate that a court may deem notice and comment unnecessary because some other mechanism
Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812, 817 (1956).
38. 132 F. Supp. at 883.
39. S. REP.NO. 752, supra note 2, at 14; H.R. REP.NO. 1980, supra note 2, at 24.
40. 496 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1974).
41. Id. at 249.
42. See generally Union of Concerned Scientists v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 499
F.2d 1069, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (balancing of general welfare with impact in a constitutional due process context).

102

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I980

provides interested parties with an opportunity to present their
views on the matter. In Appalachian Power Co. u. EPA?' it was
argued that EPA approval and promulgation of state plans for
implementation of federal ambient air quality standards were
invalid because hearings were not held by the EPA prior to publication of the plans.44The court repelled this attack on the regulations saying that the parties had been afforded opportunity
to voice their objections to the plans in hearings held by the
state.46This, the court reasoned, coupled with a tight statutory
deadline imposed by Congress-indicating its concern that the
plans be promulgated as expeditiously as possible-rendered
hearings at the EPA level both "unnecessary" and "impracticable." Therefore, the requirements of section 553(b)(B) to dispense with public proceedings for good cause had been met?
Two facts diminish the precedential value of this case as
support for the proposition that other types of proceedings may
be good-cause substitutes for notice and comment. First, it is
notable that the court did not base its holding solely on the
prior opportunity to be heard in state hearings or on the statutory deadline. The court deemed the combination of the two to
rise to the level of good cause, but expressed no view that either
aspect alone was adequate. Second, the petitioners were seeking
a hearing rather than just notice and opportunity to ~omrnent.'~
The court drew a distinction between hearings and other procedures, and its holding was limited to the decision that no hearing before the EPA was required. Consequently, a lesser showing
of good cause was probably found adequate than would have
been the case had the petitioners been seeking only notice and
43. 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973).
44. The court in dicta suggested that additional procedural requirements beyond
those found in § 553 could be imposed if the question involved so demanded. Id. at 501.

In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978), this dicta was overruled. There it was held that while an agency

could in its discretion grant additional procedural rights, such rights could not be imposed by the courts; § 553 establishes the maximum mandatory procedural requirements.
45. The record of the state hearings was not before the court, and accordingly it
could not "determine whether those hearings provided the petitioners with the type of
hearing the importance of their rights required." 477 F.2d at 503. .The case was thus
remanded. On consideration after remand the court held that the state hearings had
adequately satisfied the requirements of due process. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,
579 F.2d 846 (4th Cir. 1978).
46. 477 F.2d at 503.
47. See id. at 500-03.
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opportunity for comment.
In few cases would state hearings or other mechanisms for
public input directed at parties other than the agency promulgating the rule truly afford parties an opportunity to comment
in the way contemplated by section 553. An agency engaged in
rulemaking does so under the auspices of federal authority delegated by Congress, and its rules have the force of law.48This fact
is likely to provide an incentive to interested parties wishing to
present views not present in other contexts. Also, a strong possibility exists that notice of such other public proceedings as may
have been provided was not as extensive as the publication in
the Federal Register required by section 553, which constitutes
constructive notice to all citizens of the United States?
A second type of case in this category is that in which comment subsequent to the promulgation of the rule is deemed by
the court to satisfy the requirement of notice and opportunity
for comment. In Pent-R-Books, Inc. v. United States Postal
S e r ~ i c enotice
, ~ ~ of a proposed rulemaking concerning use of the
mails for sexually oriented advertising was published in the Federal Register on January 12, 1971, calling for comment to be received by January 20, 1971. On January 30, 1971, revised regulations were published and were made effective on publication
with the stipulation that comment would be considered after the
effective date. After receipt and consideration of additional comment, amended regulations were published on May 5, 1971. The
court stated that whatever objection there was to the original
regulations as published on January 30 was disposed of by the
repromulgati~n.~~
While this case raises the issue of whether interested parties had "the reality of an opportunity to submit an
effective presentati~n,"~~
it is not clearly a good cause exception
case; prior notice and opportunity to comment were provided,
though on a reduced scale. The case does, however, point to the
idea that allowance of comment after publication may be adequate to correct deficiencies in compliance with the notice and
comment requirement.
It seems unlikely that postpromulgation opportunity to
48. K. DAVIS,ADMINISTRATIVE
LAWTEXT 126-27 (3d ed. 1972).
49. 44 U.S.C. $ 1508 (1976).
50. 328 F. Supp. 297 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
51. Id. at 312.
52. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 503 (4th Cir. 1973) (quoting Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
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comment would ever be found to substitute for prepromulgation
notice and comment in the absence of some other showing of
good cause. But a court may be willing to accept a lesser standard of good cause than that prescribed by section 553 where
postpromulgation comment has been accepted.53However, this
approach has been rejected in several decisions." One court succinctly stated: "The reception of comments after all the crucial
decisions have been made is not the same as permitting active
and well prepared criticism to become a part of the decisionmaking process."55 Postpromulgation comment is nowhere provided for in section 553 as a substitute for prepromulgation notice and comment:6 and it should not relieve the agency from
providing prepromulgation notice and comment, or from meeting the strict requirements of good cause contained in section
553(b)(B).57
The courts generally have restricted the use of the "unnecessary" aspect of the good cause exception to cases where the
rule could truly be classified as "minor or merely technical, . . .
in which the public is not particularly interested."" The congressional reports point out that the "unnecessary" aspect of the
good cause exception can also be employed "where authority
beneficial to the public does not become operative until a rule is
issued."5s In these cases "the agency may promulgate the neces53. See e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979) (discussed in text accompanying notes 89-105 infra).
54. American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1977); Maryland v.
EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975); City of New York v. Diamond, 379 F. Supp. 503
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Kelly v. United States Dep't of Interior, 399 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Cal.
1972).
55. Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 222 (4th Cir. 1975).
56. Wagner Electric Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1020 (3d Cir. 1972). However, if
the standard of good cause contained in 5 553(b)(B) is met, Congress suggests that postpromulgation comment is desirable. See S. REP. NO. 752, supra note 2, a t 13-14; H.R.
REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, at 23-24; Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train,
510 F.2d 692, 711 n.103 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
57. Agencies have attempted to avoid this consequence by calling the final regulation "interim final" and later promulgating the "final" rule. However, as the regulation
would be effective when published in interim final form, proceeding in this manner is
substantively no different than promulgation of a final rule with a later repromulgation,
and so must be rejected on the same grounds. See American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA,
568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1977); Consumers Union, Inc. v. Sawhill, 393 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C.),
aff'd per curiam, 523 F.2d 1404 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975).
58. S. REP. NO. 752, supra note 2, a t 14; H.R. REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, at 24.
See, e.g., United States v. United States Trucking Corp., 317 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
59. S. REP. NO. 752, supra note 2, at 14; H.R. REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, at 24.
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sary rule immediately and rely upon supplemental procedures in
the nature of a public reconsideration of the issued rule to satisfy the requirement of [section 553]."60 Thus, in the rare instances where a regulation has only beneficial effect on the public-such as a regulation implementing a tax relief measure-the
agency is authorized to refine the regulation through postpromulgation comment proceedings.

B. Recent Interpretations of the "Good Cause" Exception
in Air Quality Non-Attainment Designation Cases
A recent series of cases in the circuit courts depicts the continuing confusion and uncertainty with which the federal courts
approach the issue of what constitutes good cause to dispense
with notice and opportunity for comment prior to promulgation
of an agency rule. Under nearly identical factual and procedural
settings, and in regard to the issuance of the same regulations,
the Third and Fifth Circuits ruled that "good cause" did not
exist for dispensing with prepromulgation notice and comment,"
while the Seventh Circuit ruled that there was indeed "good
cause" and allowed the regulations to stand?'
As originally enacted, the Clean Air Act (CL~A)~'
required
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards
(NAAQS)Mand the states to develop implementation plans to
achieve these standard^.^^ In 1977, the CAA was amended to extend the primary compliance deadline to 1982 and to prescribe a
.~
the new process, the states
new implementation p r o c e ~ sUnder
were to submit to the Administrator of the EPA within 120 days
60. Id.
61. Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979); United States Steel
Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979).
62. United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 710 (1980).
63. Ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 55 7401-7626
(Supp. I 1977)).
64. 42 U.S.C. 3 7409(a) (Supp. I 1977). The national primary ambient air quality
standards are those which, in the judgment of the Administrator of the EPA, are requisite to protect the public health. Id. 5 7409(b)(l). The national secondary ambient air
quality standards are those which, in the judgment of the Administrator of the EPA, are
requisite to protect the public welfare. Id. 5 7409(b)(2). These standards, promulgated by
the Administrator of the EPA pursuant to the statutory mandate, are codified a t 40
C.F.R. $5 50.1-50.11 (1979).
65. 42 U.S.C. 5 7410 (Supp. I 1977).
66. Act of A u ~ 7,
. 1977, Pub. L. NO. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
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after August 1, 1977, a list of air quality regions or portions of
regions that did not meet the NAAQS.67 The Administrator of
the EPA was to promulgate these lists with any modifications he
deemed necessary within sixty days after the states' submiss i o n ~ On
. ~ ~March 3, 1978, without prior notice of a proposed
rulemaking or opportunity for comment by interested parties,
the EPA promulgated a list of attainment designations based on
the states' submission^.^^
One effect of the promulgation was to require the states to
incorporate more stringent provisions into the state implementation plan for areas that had been designated "non-attainment."'O
Such revised implementation plans were to be submitted to the
EPA no later than January 1, 1979." The more immediate impact of a nonattainment designation, however, resulted from a
pre-existing EPA interpretive ruling-the "Offset R~ling."~'
This ruling was explicitly adopted by Congress, had the force of
law, and was enforceable by the EPA. The ruling severely limited construction or modification of facilities that would contribute to an existing violation of a N A ~ A Q S . ~ ~
Steel companies operating plants in areas that had been
designated "non-attainment" attacked the EPA promulgation of
the attainment designation lists, contending, among other
things, that the EPA violated the procedural requirements of
the APA. The EPA had published a statement with the March
3, 1978 promulgation asserting good cause based upon the tight
statutory deadlines imposed by Congress, and upon the need to
provide expeditious guidance to the states to enable them to formulate their implementation plans. It was contended that these
grounds made it "impracticable and contrary to the public interest" to provide for prepromulgation notice and comment."
67. 42 U.S.C. 3 7407(d)(l) (Supp. I 1977).
68. Id. § 7407(d)(2).
69. 43 Fed. Reg. 8,962 (1978).
70. 42 U.S.C. $ 7502 (Supp. I 1977).
71. Act of Aug. 7, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129(c), 91 Stat. 750-51 (1977)
(uncodified).
72. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976).
73. See United States Steel v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 1979); 42 U.S.C. 5
7413(a)(5) (Supp. I 1977).
74. See 43 Fed. Reg. 8,962 (1978). The full text of the statement is as follows:
The States are now preparing revisions to their State implementation plans
(SIPS) as required by sections 110(a)(2)(1) and 172 of the Act [42 U.S.C. $8
7410(a)(2)(1),75021. This enterprise, which must be completed by January 1,
1979, requires that the States have immediate guidance as to the attainment
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The Third Circuit was the first to hand down an opinion. In
Sharon Steel Corporation v. EPA,?5 the court reasoned that it
should have been apparent to Congress at the time the amendments to the CAA were passed that tight statutory deadlines
were being imposed, yet it did not express an intention that the
amendments should relieve the EPA from the notice and comment requirement? The court went on to suggest that the statutory schedule did not preclude prior notice and comment. The
state designations could have been published as a proposed rule,
satisfying the APA requirement that the notice of rulemaking
include "either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a
description of the subjects and issues involved."77 The EPA then
could have accepted comments and promulgated the final rule
"on about April 15, 1978, instead of the March 3 date . . .
achieved without notice and comment^,"^^ which would still
have allowed adequate time for the states to draft their plans.
The court thus concluded that the statutory deadlines did not
constitute good cause to dispense with notice and comment.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the states could
have commenced development of the plans at the time they submitted the designations to the EPA and then made modifications as necessary if their designations were altered by the
EPA? The court further held that the violation of the APA's
notice and comment requirement was not cured by acceptance
of comments after promulgation of the rule, since the decision of
status of the areas designated under section 107(d). Congress has acknowledged this by imposing a tight schedule on the designation process and requiring EPA to promulgate the list within 180 days of the enactment of the
amendments. Under these circumstances it would be impracticable and contrary to the public interest to ignore the statutory schedule and postpone publishing these regulations until notice and comment can be effectuated. For this
good cause, the Administrator has made these designations immediately
effective.

Id.
75. 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979).
76. Id. at 380.
77. 5 U.S.C. $ 553(b)(3) (1976). The Third Circuit had formerly noted that the final
rule need not be identical to the proposed rule for notice to be effective: "[Tlhe adequacy of the notice must be tested by determining whether it would fairly apprise interested persons of the 'subjects and issues' before the agency." American Iron and Steel
Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 293 (3d Cir. 1977).
78. Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 1979). Even without providing notice and comment the EPA had missed the February 3, 1978 deadline. Id. a t
380 n.7.
79. Id. at 380.
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Congress was to provide for prior notice and comment to allow
"effective participation in the rulemaking process while the decisionmaker is still receptive to the information and a r g ~ m e n t . " ~ ~
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue next, and in United
States Steel Corporation u. EPAS1concluded, as had the Third
Circuit earlier, that the tight statutory schedule proposed by the
EPA as good cause was insufficient to meet the requirements of
section 553(b)(B), and that postpromulgation opportunity for
comment was not an adequate substitute for prepromulgation
notice and comment. The court thought that a tight statutory
deadline was a factor to be considered in determining whether
there is good cause, but that it could not be "good cause" by
itself?' The court also recognized that there were "substantial
public health interests involved," yet it did not find them adequate to satisfy the narrow exception to the notice and comment
requirement contained in section 553(b)(B)? The court implicitly analyzed the good cause exception in terms of the second
category of the exception discussed above, where a delay in promulgation could have detrimental consequences to the public
health, safety, or welfare. While the impact on the public health
was deemed significant, and while it was perceived that the congressional time framework indicated a concern with the public
health, in the absence of express congressional indication that
the rulemaking procedure of the APA was not to apply, the
court was unable to find that the public health interest outweighed the interest of the steel companies in having a voice in
the rulemaking process. This was particularly true where the
nonattainment designations, when coupled with the prior Offset
Ruling, would strictly limit new construction or modification of
plants in areas designated nonattainment." Characterizing the
good cause exception as "an important safety valve to be used
where delay would do real harm,"s6 the court found the harm to
the steel companies caused by depriving them of prior notice
and an opportunity to comment too substantial to be overcome
by the potential harm to the public health and safety that would
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 381.
595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 213.
Id. at 214.
595 F.2d at 211.
Id.
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have attended the delay in promulgation of the designation^.^^
The court went on to hold that acceptance of comments after the promulgation of the rules did not cure the infirmity of
the rules. It stated that to approve such a procedure "would
make the provisions of § 553 virtually ~nenforceable,"~'since an
agency wishing "to dispense with pre-promulgation notice and
comment could simply do SO,invite post-promulgation comment,
and republish the regulation before a reviewing court could
In spite of the decisions of the Third and Fifth Circuits
holding that "good cause" to dispense with notice and comment
did not exist, the Seventh Circuit decided in United States
Steel Corporation v. EPA8@that the EPA did have good cause to
dispense with notice and comment under section 553(b)(B). The
court further reasoned that even if good cause did not exist to
dispense with notice and comment under section 553(b)(B),
comment could be postponed under a lesser standard of good
cause found in section 553(d)(3) until after the promulgation of
the final rule.@O
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the statutory deadlines
imposed on the EPA to promulgate the attainment designations
86. Id. at 214-15.
87. Id. at 215.
88. Id.
89. 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 710 (1980).
90. Ultimately the Seventh Circuit held that even if the procedural requirements of
§ 553 had not been met, it could not reverse the EPA's action, since 42 U.S.C. §
7607(d)(9)(D) limited reversal for failure to observe procedure to cases where
(i) such failure to observe such procedure is arbitrary or capricious, (ii) the
requirement of paragraph (7)(B) [requiring that the procedural objection be
raised during the period of public comments] has been met, and (iii) the condition of the last sentence of paragraph (8) [requiring that procedural error be
"so serious and related to matters of such central relevance to the rule that
there is a substantial likelihood that the rule would have been significantly
changed if such errors had not been made"] is met.
42 U.S.C. $ 7607(d)(9)(D) (Supp. I 1977). Since the court found that none of these requirements had been met by the petitioning steel companies, it held that there could be
no reversal for the procedural errors. 605 F.2d at 291. However, it should be noted that
the Fifth Circuit had earlier dismissed United States Steel's argument that the more
stringent procedural requirements of 7607(d) should be met by the EPA on remand,
saying that the "designations are plainly not among the actions enumerated in
§ 7607(d)," United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 215 n.17 (5th Cir. 1979), and
that the provisions of $ 7607(d) therefore did not apply. In his vigorous dissent to the
denial of certiorari to the Seventh Circuit case, Justice Rehnquist said that the Seventh
Circuit's holding on this issue "[had] the effect of establishing two Administrative Procedure Acts, one for the EPA and one for all other agencies." United States Steel Corp. v.
EPA, 100 US. Ct. 710, 711 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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and on the states to formulate implementation plans were adequate to satisify the "impracticable" aspect of the section
553(b)(B) good cause exception. Reliance was placed on the substitution of "impracticable, unnecessary or contrary to the public interest" for "impracticable because of unavoidable lack of
time or other emergency," which had been found in earlier versions of the bill that was later to become the APA?' The court
deemed that this change in language had broadened the except i ~ n This
. ~ ~conclusion is undercut by the congressional reports
on the bill drafted after the modification, which state that the
exclusion was to be operative only upon a "true and supported
or supportable finding of necessity or emergen~y."~~
Additionally, no circuit court had previously held that tight statutory
deadlines alone were adequate to satisfy the good cause requirement necessary to dispense with notice and comment. Arguably,
the elimination of the "because of unavoidable lack of time" language narrowed, rather than broadened, the scope of the section
553(b)(B) exception, since lack of time was eliminated as an exigency sufficient to dispense with notice and comment.
The court also relied on two cases to support its assertion
"that the 'good cause' exception may be utilized to comply with
~ ~both cases the relithe rigors of a tight statutory s c h e d ~ l e . "In
ance is ill-founded. In the first, Clay Broadcasting Corp. v.
United States,9s prior notice of the rulemaking had been published in the Federal Register and a large number of comments
had been received? The challenge was to making the final rules
effective immediately upon publication, rather than to the failure to provide prior notice and comment. Therefore, this case
was clearly governed by section 553(d)(3), not section 553(b)(B).
The second case relied upon by the Seventh Circuit, Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Federal Energy A d m i n i s t r a t i ~ n ,in~
volved regulations governing the pricing of crude oil. These regulations were required by statute to be promulgated within 15
days of the enactment of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation
91. S. 7, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 4(a) (1945).
92. 605 F.2d at 287.
93. S. REP.NO. 752, supra note 2, at 14; H.R. REP.NO. 1980, supra note 2, at 24.
94. 605 F.2d at 287.
95. 464 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1972,) reu'd on other grounds sub nom. National Cable
Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
96. Id. at 1316.
97. 447 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Kan.), reu'd on other grounds sub nom. Energy Reserves
Group, Inc. v. Department of Energy, 589 F.2d 1082 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
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Act.08 The challenged regulations exempted "stripper" well production from price controls. Though the statutory deadline was
significantly shorter than that facing the EPA in promulgation
of the nonattainment designations, and though by its abridged
duration alone the deadline implied a congressional intent to
dispense with notice and comment, it played only a minor role
in the court's determination that good cause existed to exclude
the rulemaking from the notice and comment r e q ~ i r e m e n t . ~ ~
The court recognized that the purpose of the rule was to encourage domestic production of crude oil in order to relieve the
effects of the Arab oil boycott.loOHad prior notice of the impending release of price controls on stripper well oil production
been published, such oil would have been held off the market in
anticipation of the price increase, aggravating the already severe
petroleum shortage. Energy Reserves Group, therefore, fits
nicely into the first category of the "good cause" exception,
where the goal of the regulation would be thwarted by prior
public notice.
The Seventh Circuit, apparently feeling uncomfortable with
a decision based solely on the tight statutory deadline, mentioned that continuing adverse impact on health would be
caused by further delay, and in a footnote included tables of estimates of adverse health effects if the NAAQS were not met in
1980.lo1While it is apparent that some adverse health impact is
possible if the air pollution standards are not attained, it is not
clear that provision of a notice and comment period would have
significantly set back the attainment of such standards. As was
pointed out by the Third Circuit, if a notice and comment period had originally been provided, the designation lists still
could have been promulgated with adequate time for the states
to develop implementation plans by January 1, 1979, the date
required by statute.loaMoreover, the implementation plans were
not the end result, but were to provide for the attainment of the
air quality standards by December 31, 1982. And in certain circumstances, and for certain pollutants, such attainment could be
delayed until December 31, 1987.loSWhen filtered through this
98. 447 F. Supp. at 1139.
99. See id. at 1150.
100. See id. at 1138.
101. 605 F.2d at 288 & n.10.
102. Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 1979).
103. 42 U.S.C. 5 7502(a)(b) (Supp. I 1977).
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protracted chain of statutory requirements, it is doubtful that
provision of a notice and comment period would have significantly delayed the ultimate attainment of the air pollution standards. In such cases, where the potential for impact on public
health is small and speculative in comparison to the real interest
of parties to have an opportunity to comment, the strict provisions of the good cause exception have not been met.
Even if the EPA's actions were not justified by the impracticability standards of section 553, the Seventh Circuit reasoned
that they were justified by the good cause exception found in
section 553(d)(3). The court felt that section 553(d)(3) could be
used to dispense with prior notice and comment, rather than notice and comment altogether, and that section 553(d)(3) allowed
for a broader standard of good cause.lo4While section 553(d)(3)
arguably allows for a broader standard of good cause, and while
it could have justified the EPA in publishing the rule effective
immediately, it cannot be used to postpone notice and comment
until after publication of a final rule. Section 553(d)(3) relates
only to the conditions under which a final rule can be made effective less than 30 days after its publication. It does not relate
to when or under what conditions notice and comment need be
provided. As stated in the Senate Judiciary Committee Report,
" [section 553(d)] does not provide procedures alternative to notice and other public proceedings required by the prior subsections of this section [sections 553(a)-(c)]."lo6As has been previously noted, an agency wishing to dispense with prepromulgation notice and comment must meet the good cause requirement of section 553(b)(B) , even where postpromulgation
opportunity for comment is provided.

IV. TOWARD
A CONSISTENT
APPLICATION
OF THE GOODCAUSE
EXCEPTION
This Comment has pointed out a number of differences in
the federal courts' interpretation of what constitutes good cause
within the meaning of section 553(b)(B). Some courts have implied that other proceedings may substitute for the notice and
comment procedure required by the APA, or that postpromulgation comment can correct the absence of prepromulgation notice
104. 605 F.2d at 289-90.
105. S. REP.NO. 752, supra note 2, at 15; see also H.R. REP.NO. 1980, supra note 2,
at 25.
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and comment. Other courts have confused the standard to dispense with prior notice and comment with the standard to publish a rule with immediate effect. Where public health and safety
are involved, the courts have not articulated the bases of their
decisions that provision of notice and comment would have had
such an impact as to meet the congressional standard of "impracticability9'-that is, impairment of "the due and required
execution of the agency functions."106 As is demonstrated by the
recent series of cases involving the EPA air quality nonattainment designations, courts applying different criteria can come to
different conclusions on whether good cause is present, even
where virtually identical factual and procedural settings are
presented.
While certain things seem clear-such as that other proceedings cannot be good-cause substitutes for the notice and
comment procedure, and that statutory deadlines alone are inadequate to constitute good cause-a rule of interpretation that
will effectuate the congressional intention that "the legislative
functions of administrative agencies shall so far as possible be
necessary.
~
At the
exercised only upon public p a r t i c i p a t i ~ n "is~ ~
same time, agencies must be allowed flexibility to deal with
problematical situations. With these goals in mind, it is apparent that the good cause exception is appropriately applicable in
three sets of circumstances.
The first and clearest case for application of the exception is
where the problem sought to be alleviated would be exacerbated
by the actions of those affected if they became aware of the regulation before its implementation. The inquiry in this area
should be focused on what problem the regulation addresses and
how public notification of the content of the regulation in advance of its promulgation would affect that problem. A determination that such notification would worsen'the problem would
justify application of the good cause exception.
Cases where the delay caused by the notice and comment
period would in and of itself result in significant public harm
constitute the second situation for application of the exception.
Most cases of rulemaking in areas affecting the public health,
safety, or welfare involve ongoing problems, and significant additional harm will not be caused if the problem is allowed to con106. S. R ~ P No.
. 752,supra note 2, at 14;H.R. REP. NO. 1980,supra note 2, at 24.
107. H.R. REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, at 23.
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tinue for the relatively short period of time required to provide
for prepromulgation notice and comment. Thus, in order to preserve the integrity of the notice and comment procedure, the
good cause exception should be employed in such cases only
where there is a measurable, demonstrable, and significant impact on the public health, safety, or welfare, directly caused by
the delay necessary to provide the opportunity for comment.
The third situation for appropriate application of the good
cause exception is where the rulemaking relates only to a minor
or merely technical ruling over which little or no public concern
could be expected. This category corresponds to the "unnecessary" aspect of good cause as interpreted by the Senate Judiciary Committee Report,lo8and should be strictly limited to those
cases where the detrimental effect on any member of the public
is so minimal that no protest could reasonably be expected.
Applying the above criteria, an agency should be able to determine the propriety of dispensing with prepromulgation notice
and comment under the good cause exception, and enforcement
of these criteria by the courts should ensure the rights of the
public to participate in the administrative rulemaking process.

To effectively implement the policy that effective exercise of
delegated legislative power is premised on public participation,
it is important that deviations from the public proceedings requirements of informal rulemaking be limited to cases where
such deviation is manifestly necessary, or where public proceedings can serve no useful purpose. This Comment has suggested
that only when (1)public proceedings prior to promulgation of a
rule would exacerbate the problem sought to be corrected, (2)
the delay caused by public proceedings would in and of itself
result in significant public harm, or (3) no public concern could
reasonably be expected, should notice and comment be dispensed with under the good cause exception to the notice and
comment requirement of informal rulemaking. Careful definition
of the circumstances under which the good cause exception is
properly employed will promote the continued integrity of the
notice and comment procedure as a means of assisting agencies
in developing rules that soundly implement congressional policy
108. S.REP.NO.752, supra note 2, at 14; see also H.R. REP.NO.1980,supra note 2,
at 24.
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and as a means of providing those affected by administrative
powers an opportunity to protect their rights.
Layne M. Campbell

